Untangling the Link between Political Regime and Economic Growth: Beyond the Authoritarian-Democratic Dichotomy

Abstract

Few scholarly inquiries within political economy have proven as persistently contentious as the connection between political regime characteristics and macroeconomic growth trajectories. This paper revisits this contested terrain by subjecting a wide ranging corpus of theoretical and empirical contributions to critical scrutiny. In doing so, it deliberately sets aside the simplistic binary opposition between authoritarian and democratic rule that has predominantly framed prior scholarship. The analysis initially investigates the specific conduits through which autocratic governance might either foster or constrain economic dynamism, with particular attention to political stability, policy decisiveness, and the latent hazards associated with unconstrained executive authority. The subsequent discussion then shifts focus to the mechanisms linking democratic institutions to economic performance, notably institutional accountability, improvements in human capital, and the transitory adjustment burdens that often accompany political liberalization. By integrating insights from contemporary quasi experimental research with the established cross country econometric literature, this study contends that the longevity and institutional robustness of a polity constitute more direct and significant determinants of sustained economic progress than the nominal political label it carries. Consequently, political regime influences growth primarily through indirect pathways, operating via the behavioral incentives that governance structures generate for both state actors and private economic agents. The final section of the paper outlines several pressing unresolved questions that merit further empirical investigation within this ongoing scholarly debate.